Image Courtesy: The Warzone
Article: 43/2024
The Test per se
On 25th September 2024, China tested an ICBM over international waters, something which it has not done before since c. 1980, with all earlier tests being confined within its land borders. NOTAM and Navigational Warnings indicated that the missile was fired from north-east Hainan into south-western Pacific for a distance of nearly 12,000 Kms flying over the Philippines and Guam with the re-entry vehicle (RV, which carries the warheads and decoys) splashing into the Pacific near the French Polynesian island of Marquesas Islands.
North-east Hainan is not a test range for missiles and so it suggested that a transporter-erector-launcher-(TEL) based missile was tested. It was immediately clear that it should be an operational missile because of two reasons: one, it was launched by PLARF which handles only operational missiles; two, the Chinese referred to it as ‘annual training plan’. The Chinese Defence Ministry (MND) said, “This test launch is a routine arrangement in our annual training plan. It is in line with international law and international practice, and is not directed against any country or target.” Unusually for China, it also released a picture of the launch of the missile from a TEL.
China’s NOTAM and Navigational warnings indicated that the spent stages and the RV would impact in international waters and the flight was over international airspace. While the first stage and the RV shrouds fell into the Indo-China Sea (ICS) just off Hainan, the second stage fell into the West Philippines Sea north west of north Luzon ahead of the Babuyan Channel of the Luzon Straits and the third stage fell into the sea just after the Luzon Straits. Since no other danger area is marked in NOTAM and Navigational Warnings, we can presume that there is no post-boost phase rocket engine as the US Minuteman-III has. Usually, China tests its missiles within its land borders or into the Bohai Sea. Long range missiles are fired from the Shaanxi province (Wuzhai missile launch facility) in the east into the Taklamakan desert in the Xinjiang province in the far west using a highly lofted trajectory, sometimes even reaching an apogee of over 3000 Kms. The rough rule-of-thumb for range is four times the apogee.
Apparently, China had notified the US, France and New Zealand but not any other country. It notified the US not only because the missile overflew Guam but also because the US was the only country that could have detected a Chinese ICBM launch and taken any hostile action. The Pentagon spokeswoman said, “"We did receive some advance notification of this ICBM test, and we believe that was a good thing. That was a step in the right direction, and it does lead to preventing any misperception or miscalculation. What we can do here from the department is continue to press for a more regularized bilateral notification arrangement when it comes to ballistic missile and space launches. And this is something that we’ve proposed with the PRC, and it represents a common-sense confidence-building measures. So, we want to see these types of notifications continue." The US is said to have deployed assets, particularly its RC-135S aircraft capable of optically and electronically tracking in real-time the ballistic missiles and their RVs. The French were notified because the dummy warhead(s) landed near the French Polynesian island of Bora Bora. New Zealand was notified because the target was near the New Zealand protectorate of the Cook Islands too. The Coast Guards of Japan and the Philippines were notified by China only of possible space debris, not an ICBM launch, while no Western-Pacific island nation was informed at all.
The Missile
There is speculation about the type of missile tested, whether it was a DF-41 (12000-15000 Kms range) or a DF-31 class, especially a DF-31AG (just about 13000 Kms. range). That it was a DF-31AG is deduced from the picture released by the PLA of the launch as well as the fact that the DF-31AG is a far more off-road capable mobile with its TEL than the earlier DF-31A (the PLA-released picture shows a terrain consistent with the capabilities of a DF-31AG TEL), the successor to the more-limited range (8000 Km) first road-mobile Chinese ICBM DF-31 (the earlier DF-5 ICBMs of ~15000 Km range were liquid-fuelled and silo-based). The nearest PLARF location of a DF-31AG regiment is more than 800 Kms from Hainan in Shaoyang (Hunan province) of the Southern Theater Command. The other eight possible PLARF brigade locations from where the DF-31AG could have come are Leping (Jiangxi province) of the Eastern Theater Command, or Yibin (Sichuan Province) of the Southern Theater Command, or Datong (Shanxi Province), Tianshui (Gansu province), and Yinchuan (Ningxia Province) all of Western Theater Command, or Chifeng (Inner Mongolia Province) and Tonghua (Jilin Province) of the Northern Theater Command, or Xiangyang (Hubei Province) of the Central Theater Command. But because of long distances, we can rule out other possibilities except Shaoyang in nearby Hunan province.
The DF-31AG is a MIRVd, cannisterized (also known as a wooden round) three-stage all solid-fuel missile and is cold-launched with the help of a gas generator. The ‘missile tracking’ instrumented radar ships Yuan Wang-3 and Yuan Wang-5 (which caused a problem for India by docking in China-operated Hambantota port just ahead of India’s endo-atmospheric AD-1 ABM test in November 2022) had been positioned appropriately in south-western Pacific ahead of the ICBM test. YW-3 was located northwest of Nauru and directly under the trajectory of the ICBM flight, approximately slightly over the midway point between Hainan and French Polynesia. YW-5 was located east of the Tokelau atolls, again just under ICBM’s trajectory, and much closer to the target area (still about 2000 Kms away). The YW-5 carries long-range S-band radar to help track ICBMs at longer ranges. The CEP of a DF-31AG is claimed to be 300m while that of the silo-based DF-31 class is 150m, as the silo-based missiles are always capable of more accuracy. A variant of DF-31AG class is the submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), JL-2.
The Possible Motivations
What were the possible motivations for China to do this test? One of them, in no particular order, certainly is the ‘Extended Deterrence’ that the US, Japan, and South Korea are proceeding to implement among them along with the facts that both Japan and South Korea are integrating their command and control with the INDOPACOM. Also, South Korea has demanded that a US SSBN be placed more permanently in a South Korean base, a demand that has been accepted by the Biden administration. The assumption of power in Japan by Ishiba Shigeru who is a fierce proponent of ‘Asian NATO’ in order to deter a Ukraine-like invasion in Asia should have also added to the nervousness of China necessitating a ‘show of strength’.
The second motivation could be that there is a greater risk of war involving China within the framework of the overall meltdown in security situation in Eastern Europe and West Asia. In both instances, China has taken a strident anti-US and anti-West stance. It has identified itself with one of the parties to the conflict in both the cases. This might have prompted the PLARF to ensure a full-range testing of their ICBM in order to increase its own levels of confidence.
The third motivation could be that China expects future restrictions on its missiles and nuclear weapons whenever a new START is eventually deliberated and it wants to maximize its benefits before that. The US has been demanding that China must be included in such deliberations. China may not be able to avoid participation for too long. This test may even set a precedent for more such launches into Western Pacific to test full ranges of their DF-41 and DF-31 ICBMs and JL-2 and JL-3 SLBMs. China has an issue with launch sites for missiles (as well as satellites) because of the need to ensure that spent stages do not fall over inhabited places. The Wenchang Satellite Launch Center in North east Hainan offers locational advantages for safety as well as proximity to the Equator for geo-stationary earth orbit (GEO) launches. The present ICBM launch also seems to have occurred from closer to Wenchang.
The fourth motivation could be that the increasing assertiveness of the Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and the escalating tensions with the Philippines under Pres. ‘Bong Bong’ Marcos Jr. along with many US-led multinational joint maritime exercises in the Indo-China Sea lately, have probably prompted a response from China. It is a message to both these countries that the demonstrated Chinese deterrence would stop the US from coming to their support in case of a war.
The fifth reason could also be that Pres. Xi Jinping wanted to assure himself, as commander-in-chief of the PLA, of the fact that the most prized and sensitive PLARF was still professionally competent after a series of corruption events that led to a score of top PLARF personnel being removed from their positions. First, it was the Chinese Defence Minister Wei Fenghe, the previous commander of the PLARF, who was removed in March 2023 as Defence Minister for corruption during the time when he was the Commander of the PLARF. In June 2024, his rank as General in the PLARF was revoked. Three months after Wei Fenghe’s removal, in June 2023, the then PLARF Commander and his party Commissar were removed along with some of their subordinates. Pres. Xi Jinping lost so much confidence in PLARF that he unprecedentedly brought in a PLAN Commander, Wang Houbin, to head the PLARF. This was followed soon thereafter by the mysterious death, speculated to be suicide, of a former Deputy Commander of the PLARF. Wei Fenghe’s successor in the Ministry of National Defence (MND), General Li Shangfu, who also had extensive dealings with the PLARF during his service tenure, was also removed as the Defence Minister within five months after appointment. In December 2023, five senior officers of the PLARF, who were then part of the National Peoples’ Congress (NPC), were summarily removed. Early October 2024 saw Xiao Longxu, the former chief engineer of the PLARF, being removed from the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The corruption in PLARF was said to have been so deep that the missiles were filled with water instead of fuel (possibly in liquid-fuelled DF-5 ICBMs) and the silos were in disrepair. Since China is increasing the number of nuclear warheads and missiles at a breakneck speed in order to achieve operational parity with the US, these changes in the PLARF have been most disturbing. It is therefore possible that Pres. Xi Jinping had demanded to see a working ICBM to full range. The successful test would also vindicate Xi Jinping’s choice of the new PLARF commander after his earlier choices to this most sensitive branch of the PLA which reports directly to the Central Military Commission (CMC), had ended disastrously. It should also dispel any doubts in the minds of China’s adversaries about Chinese claims of their missiles. Within three weeks of the ICBM test, Xi Jinping visited the PLARF at Hefei (in Anhui province which throws up a possibility that the DF-31AG that was tested might have come from that regiment contrary to the popular belief of Shaoyang in Hunan). While addressing the regiment there, Xi Jinping stressed the important point “. . . to adhere to the Party’s absolute leadership over the army, deepen the Party’s theoretical arming, and carry out ideological and political work down to the launch pads in order to ensure that the troops resolutely obey the command of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission at any time and under any circumstances.” These are indicative of the insecurity among top leadership about their complete control of the PLARF following the recent spate of events in the last year. He also called for ‘comprehensively strengthen training and war preparedness’.
Conclusion
This test should not be viewed as a routine training test that various missile powers, including India, regularly do. As is usual with Chinese actions, multiple objectives have been part of the messaging. This test was as much for domestic Chinese consumption as it was a signal for external players. No other country in Asia possesses a missile of this much range. The launch is a visible and unmistakable demonstration of Chinese power. China takes pride that its governance and technology are better than those of the West. The two successive failures of the UK’s Trident SLBM (the latest being January 30, 2024 and the earlier one in c. 2016) - a missile closest to China’s JL2 which is derived from DF-31AG - and last year’s (November 1, 2023) failure of the US Minuteman-III ICBM (though the US successfully tested two Minuteman-III ICBMs later in June 2024) amplify the success of the latest Chinese test because ICBM/SLBM failures immediately introduce a huge element of uncertainty in the deterrence posture of a country. However, the US is on a huge nuclear and strategic (and tactical) missile modernization program spending USD 1.7 T as it tries to overcome its limitations imposed by various strategic treaties with the then USSR and later Russia. The Russian Sarmat missile (or Satan-II with a range of 18000 Kms. and a payload of 10 tonnes) has successively failed four times, the latest being early September, 2024. In the coming months and years, China may make it a habit to signal more by testing more production and pre-induction missiles into international waters as it may see a window of opportunity to gain an edge over the US. This is also an opportunity for China’s adversaries to understand its missiles more. With China’s small but positive step of advance notification to the US, it remains to be seen if this could lead to its participation in larger nuclear and missile talks with it either bilaterally or trilaterally along with Russia in months or years ahead.
