Image Courtesy: Indian Express
Article: 55/ 2024
The Special Representatives (SRs) of India and China, the Indian National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval and Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister and Director, CCP Foreign Affairs Commission, met in Beijing on December 18 and 19.
The Ministry of External Affairs, GoI’s report on the meeting is available here.
Analysis of GoI’s Report
The SRs reiterated the importance of maintaining a political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship.
The 'political perspective' stated above is important to recognize.
A 'political perspective' means that the issue would be seen through the 'political lens' of the contesting parties. This would mean that the solution would be predicated upon the ideological framework or belief-systems of the contesting parties or political exigencies that the leadership of the two countries may face or geopolitical dictates etc., and NOT NECESSARILY PURELY ON HISTORICAL RECORDS AND CLAIMS ALONE.
The border issue would therefore be settled between the two nations on the basis of the 'political guidance' received from the political leadership of both nations.
Therefore, McMahon Line, Shimla Agreement between plenipotentiaries of British India, Tibet & China, or the earlier accords between J&K and Tibet etc would not be considered as the final arbiters of the solution. Of course, the two parties may internally rely on these documents for their respective claims but these records won't be brought decisively to the table or even possibly at all. In other words, they may be consulted but they would not be deal breakers.
This is nothing new, but it is better to keep this in perspective. 'Political Perspective' was the basis for the formation of the SR mechanism itself in 2003. Its significance might not have been clearly understood at that time, but it is becoming obvious now.In fact, this could be the best option given the protracted negotiations for the past seventy years without much breakthrough. While it may be much easier for PRC to ‘sell’ such a solution to its people, a fractious and argumentative democratic India would find it tough to do so.
There must be enough strong reasons for convincing Indian populace and politicians. While China has a law that imposes death penalty on anyone who conceded the so-called Chinese territories to a foreign country, there is no such law in India. Yet, no Indian Prime Minister or his Party can either give away Indian territories wilfully or commit political hara-kiri with such concessions. China must therefore make it easier for Indian political leadership, as India is the only major country apart from Japan, with which it has not yet resolved its boundary dispute after making efforts in the 1990s to delineate and demarcate boundaries with 12 other peripheral nations.
The SRs positively affirmed the implementation of the latest disengagement agreement of October 2024, resulting in patrolling and grazing in relevant areas.
Therefore, it appears that the April 2020 aggression stands resolved now in toto.
With China, it always takes time. After 1962, the biggest breakthrough in the relationship came only 26 years later when PM Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing and met Deng Xiaoping. Even then only CBMs were being negotiated and the more important SR-level talks didn't start until c. 2003 when Vajpayee visited Beijing.
The Sumdorong Chu incident of 1987, though immediately and successfully countered by India militarily, took another six years to resolve politically when the 'peace agreement' was signed in c. 1993.
The Ladakh 2020 incident has taken four-and-a-half years.
The Chinese attacked the Soviet Union along the Ussuri River over the border issue in 1969. Like Ladakh 2020, the clashes and tension remained for almost a year. It was resolved after 28 years in 1997.
The Chinese attacked Vietnam in 1979 and it took over a decade to normalize relations between these two Communist countries.
Doka La of 2017 was the only exception where the resolution was quick and there might be other reasons.
They emphasised the need to ensure peaceful conditions on the ground so that issues on the border do not hold back the normal development of bilateral relations.
The above is a clear message from India that 'business as usual' was not going to happen if China did not maintain peace along the LAC.
China, especially Wang Yi, tried so much to make India budge from that position to which India stuck tenaciously. India’s efforts at normalization to pre-Covid levels will be calibrated consistent with milestones being reached along the way.
In any case, since trust has been once again breached by China in c. 2020 and India has formulated new laws regarding investments or imports from China since then, those laws would remain in place and would not be diluted. China will have to live with them.
Drawing on the learnings from the events of 2020, they discussed various measures to maintain peace and tranquillity on the border and advance effective border management.
Considering the fact that it was China which surreptitiously aggressed India unprovocatively, India and especially its armed forces, would have further tightened the CBMs that were already in vogue. India’s increased attention to border infrastructure developments would continue and considerably help in the future management of such incidents.
The SRs exchanged views on bilateral, regional and global issues of mutual interest.
This is interesting. The SR mechanism, as originally envisaged, did not include discussion of such issues. The original scope of the SR mechanism was to resolve only the boundary dispute on the basis of:
Political parameters and guiding principles
Reach a final package settlement
Delineate and demarcate the boundary
Are we to assume that the SR mechanism is being enlarged to cover other issues?
(Mr. Subramanyam Sridharan is a Distinguished Member of C3S. The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of C3S.)
