As China grows stronger economically and militarily, it might pose constraints for Russia by seeking concessions that may be unwarranted and could go against India’s interests. This is where Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Moscow has balanced the tilt.
Image Courtesy: Hindustan Times
Article Courtesy: First Post
Article: 31/2024
The 22nd Annual Bilateral Summit between Russia and India was held on July 8–9, 2024, in Moscow, with the attendance of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who last visited Moscow in 2019, nearly half a decade ago. During this visit, the Indian PM was conferred with the Order of Saint Andrew the Apostle, the highest civilian honour in Russia.
Apart from discussions stemming from the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership shared between India and Russia, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on ‘India-Russia cooperation in trade, economic, and investment spheres in the Russian Far East for the period from 2024 to 2029, as well as cooperation principles in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation’, stands out.
This represents an agreement between New Delhi and Moscow for cooperation in the Russian Far East and Arctic. Both parties agreed to share approaches to building a new architecture of stable and efficient transport corridors to expand logistics links, with an emphasis on implementing the Chennai-Vladivostok (Eastern Maritime) Corridor and the International North-South Transport Corridor. They also discussed utilising the potential of the Northern Sea Route, as outlined in the joint statement released.
The diminishment of Arctic Sea ice due to global warming and climate change has led to increased human activities in the Arctic and heightened interest in this region. In the past decade, the emergence of great power competition between the US, Russia, and China has introduced competition and tension into the Arctic’s geopolitical environment.
Russia’s war against Ukraine in 2022 further affected the region’s geopolitical environment by prompting the seven Arctic states, other than Moscow, to suspend Arctic cooperation with Russia. This led to the ostracisation of Moscow by the A7 member states club (seven Arctic states excluding Russia). The further diminishment of Arctic ice could, in the coming years, lead to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic Sea routes—the Northern Sea Route close to Russia and the Northwest Passage close to Alaska and through the Canadian archipelago.
Additionally, changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow for more onshore and offshore exploration for oil, gas, and minerals, thereby leading to more powerplay, muscle-flexing, and scrambling for resources by countries like China.
Russia’s war in Ukraine substantially affected the Arctic’s geopolitical environment. It pushed Russia closer to China, leading to a coordinated stance on mutual interests. In March 2022, the seven Arctic states excluding Russia, known as the Arctic 7 or A7, announced a temporary pause in their participation in all Arctic Council meetings.
Subsequently, China’s special envoy to the Arctic reportedly stated that China would not recognise the legitimacy of an Arctic Council that excludes Russia. However, he also mentioned that China would continue to cooperate in the Arctic with both the A7 states and Russia. In response to the West, in February 2023, Russia published amendments to its Arctic policy statement that removed any mention of the Arctic Council. In April 2023, Finland joined NATO, and when Sweden became a NATO member in March 2024, it further increased NATO’s focus on the Arctic.
US tensions with Russia and diplomatic isolation from the A7 states in the Arctic have led to increased Russian cooperation with China in the region. Such developments have strengthened China’s presence and activities there. For instance, Russian oil exports to China have increased, with some of these exports using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s northern coastline.
China’s Ambitions in the Arctic
China’s diplomatic, economic, and scientific activities in the Arctic are not only a focus for the US but also for Nordic countries. Geopolitical observers have expressed concern about China’s motivations for its Arctic activities and its ultimate goals for the region.
In 2013, China was one of six non-Arctic states approved for observer status by the Arctic Council. Five years later, in January 2018, China released a white paper on China’s Arctic policy that claimed itself to be a “near-Arctic state”. The white paper also referred to trans-Arctic shipping routes as the ‘Polar Silk Road’ and identified these routes as major transportation corridors for the One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBOR). Interestingly, the polar regions (both the Arctic and the Antarctic) are included in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, covering the period from 2021 to 2025.
In terms of capability, China possesses a Ukrainian-built polar-capable icebreaker, Xue Long (Snow Dragon), which has made several transits of Arctic waters under the guise of research expeditions claimed by China. A second polar-capable icebreaker (the first built domestically by China), named Xue Long 2, entered service in 2019. Additionally, a third polar-capable icebreaker, Jidi—a ship reportedly measuring 292 feet in length with a displacement of 5,600 tonnes—was reportedly completed in December 2023.
In terms of outreach, China has expanded its diplomatic activities with the Nordic countries and increased the size of its diplomatic presence in some of them, as Beijing regards the Nordic countries as the Western end of the Chinese ‘Polar Silk Road’. Concurrently, China has engaged in economic discussions with Iceland and with Greenland, a self-governing part of the Kingdom of Denmark.
Beijing’s engagement with Greenland is significantly related to Greenland’s deposits of rare earth elements. China has also established a research station in Norway’s Svalbard archipelago and maintains a second research station in Iceland.
China appears interested in using the Northern Sea Route to shorten commercial shipping times between Europe and China and perhaps also to reduce China’s dependence on southern sea routes (including those to the Persian Gulf) that pass through the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca—a maritime chokepoint that China regards as vulnerable to closure by other parties such as India and the US in times of crisis or conflict. In addition to using the NSR, China reached an agreement with Russia in 2017 to create an ‘Ice Silk Road’.
China has made significant investments in Russia’s Arctic oil and gas industry, particularly in the Yamal natural gas megaproject located on Russia’s Yamal Peninsula in the Arctic. In February 2023, it was reported that a Russian firm had signed an agreement with a Chinese firm for the development of a titanium mining project in the Russian Arctic.
China is also interested in Arctic fishing grounds as part of its food security strategy. However, for Arctic governance, this could increase commercial and illegal fishing activity in the region and exacerbate regional disputes between Arctic and non-Arctic states over fishing rights. Changes in the Arctic are already resulting in the migration of fish stocks to new waters.
The Chinese high-altitude surveillance balloon that flew over parts of the US and Canada in early 2023 reportedly entered United States airspace on January 28, 2023, north of the Aleutian Islands, which are part of US Arctic territory. A March 2023 press report stated that months before a Chinese spy balloon drifted across Alaska and Canada, the Canadian military discovered and retrieved Chinese spy buoys in the Arctic, a region of long interest to Beijing. The Chinese buoys were monitoring US submarines and the melting of ice sheets.
Incidentally, what makes this region good for shipping also makes it the preferred route for the deployment of ballistic missiles aimed at the US. This is because missiles from China or Russia can reach targets in the United States most quickly when they fly over the Arctic Ocean. The high north also provides the shortest distance between the United States and Eurasia.
A July 2023 press report stated that China has completed the field testing and evaluation of an underwater listening device that will be deployed on a large scale in the Arctic Ocean, according to the Polar Research Institute of China. China’s activities in the Arctic additionally reflect a view among China’s leaders that Beijing, like other major world powers, should be active in the polar regions for conducting research and other purposes. It should be noted that, along with its growing activities in the Arctic, China has also increased the number of research stations it maintains in Antarctica.
All these activities by China in the Arctic pose challenges to the Arctic states in terms of defending their own interests in the region. Observing China and its aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea, Beijing could also seek to emulate the same by restricting freedom of navigation in the Arctic as it grows its naval might.
China’s investments in Greenland, especially in mining rare earth elements, raised US concerns about growing Chinese influence in the Arctic. In 2018, the US urged Denmark to finance airport construction in Greenland to counter Chinese efforts. Consequently, Denmark decided to fund the airport projects, mitigating China’s potential influence in the region. In 2019, the US State Department announced plans to establish a permanent diplomatic presence in Greenland and reopened the US consulate in Nuuk in June 2020. In April 2020, the US provided a $12.1 million economic aid package to Greenland, highlighting concerns over Chinese and Russian influence.
Observers believe this desire to counter China and Russia contributed to former US President Donald Trump’s interest in buying Greenland in August 2019. Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic, including China’s investments in Russia’s Arctic oil and gas sector, strengthens their strategic partnership. A February 2022 joint statement confirmed their commitment to Arctic development. However, Russian officials are also concerned that China’s growing economic and military power could eventually subordinate Russia, making it a junior partner.
One more area of divergence lies in the fact that China’s actions denote an aim to internalise the Arctic space, which might go against the wishes of Russia and her interests. However, following Russia’s ongoing war efforts with Ukraine, Moscow needs Beijing more than Beijing needs Moscow.
As China grows stronger economically and militarily, it might also pose constraints for Russia by seeking concessions that may be unwarranted and could go against India’s interests. This is where Indian Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Moscow has balanced the tilt. India must shed its reticence and seize the Russian offer for New Delhi to play a greater role in the Far East and Arctic arena. Additionally, in terms of Arctic governance, it must be noted that India maintains cordial relations with all the players in the Arctic Council.
Indian Scenario
It may also be noted that although the National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR), under the Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES), is the nodal agency for India’s polar research programme, which includes Arctic studies, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) provides the external interface to the Arctic Council through the United Nations Economic and Social (UNES) Division.
However, the eight countries of the Arctic Council are divided between the Americas, Eurasia, and Central Europe Divisions. Therefore, the need of the hour is a ‘Whole of Government Approach’ rather than a silo-based approach, as noted by Retd Naval Captain Anurag Bisen, who was instrumental in drafting India’s Arctic Policy. He also adds that it may be worthwhile for the Ministry of External Affairs to nominate ‘Thematic Ambassadors’ or a ‘Special Envoy’ dedicated to Arctic affairs, which could benefit India in the long run in terms of her Arctic endeavours.
In 2023, India stepped up its focus on the exploration of critical minerals, and the government released a list of 30 critical minerals for India. Consequently, Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL) deepened engagements with countries like Argentina, Australia, and others to acquire critical and strategic mineral assets. This long-term plan aimed to identify and acquire overseas mineral assets of a critical and strategic nature, such as lithium, cobalt, and others, to ensure supply-side assurance. It is here that the Arctic can potentially address India’s deficiency in strategic and rare earth minerals.
In a speech in May 2019, then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned of the dangers of Chinese investment in the Arctic. He also dismissed Beijing’s claims of being a “near-Arctic state,” noting that the shortest distance between China and the Arctic is 900 miles. “There are only Arctic states and non-Arctic states. No third category exists, and claiming otherwise entitles China to exactly nothing,” he remarked. This stance can act in India’s favour by countering China’s expansive territorial claims and influence in strategic regions.
The Arctic presents New Delhi with both challenges and opportunities. With its growing influence and credentials, India is well-positioned to play a stabilising role in the region, contributing to the greater global good. By actively engaging with Russia and Arctic affairs, India can help foster development and international cooperation in this strategic space.
(Mr. Balasubramanian C is an Associate Professor at C3S. The views expressed are those of the author and does not reflect the views of C3S.)
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