Image Courtesy: Sunday Guardian
Article 56/2024
Let us consider here the statements put out by the Ministry of External Affairs, GoI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China (dated December 18, 2024) as well as the response of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian in regular press conference on December 19, 2024.
The Chinese Statement had six paragraphs while the Indian statement had 8 paragraphs.
Spokesperson Lin Jian said that India and China had reached ‘six points of consensus’ on the boundary question. These are clearly the Chinese interpretations, and Lin Jian is incrementally amplifying the Chinese ideas as though they were agreed upon in the SR meeting.
We will consider clause by clause and note convergences and divergences, if any. Important clauses or phrases are bolded and underlined. My comments are in plum.
“Both sides positively evaluated the solution reached between the two countries” – China (This is the first of the six points of the ‘supposed’ consensus that Lin Jian mentioned)“The SRs positively affirmed the implementation of the latest disengagement agreement of October 2024, resulting in patrolling and grazing in relevant areas.” – India
The issue of stoppage of normal patrolling and traditional grazing occurred since April 2020 as a result of the Chinese aggression in Eastern Ladakh. Therefore, India mentioned it during the meeting and China sidestepped it in its readout.
“Reiterated that the implementation work should continue” – China
This is concerning because the Indian side has implicitly conceded that the implementation is finished (Clause # 1 above) while China clearly does not think so. Obviously, there is still the question of the buffer zones. They must be undone as we have to go back to status quo ante. Does this mean that there is a difference between India and China over buffer zones? They did not exist prior to April 2020 and therefore are untenable anymore.
“[both sides] believed that the border issue should be properly handled from the overall situation of bilateral relations so as not to affect the development of bilateral relations” – China
Lin Jian went one step ahead in his press conference and said, “They agreed that the boundary question should be handled appropriately in the context of the overall bilateral relationship to ensure they do not affect the development of bilateral ties.
(This is the second of the six points of the ‘supposed’ consensus that Lin Jian mentioned)
The corresponding Indian statement is, “The SRs reiterated the importance of maintaining a political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship while seeking a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable framework for settlement of the boundary question and resolved to inject more vitality into this process.”
The Chinese formulation clearly betrays its intentions. It is in a tearing hurry to normalize the economic, trade, and political relationships with India, in order to handle the headwinds it is facing both internally and externally. The Indian side, by linking ‘political perspective’ with ‘boundary question’ has made it clear that China needed to agree to a framework for resolution of the boundary question.
“Both sides agreed to continue to take measures to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas and promote the healthy and stable development of bilateral relations”. - China
Lin Jian said, “Both sides also agreed to continue taking measures to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas and to promote the healthy and stable development of bilateral relations.”
(This is the third of the six points of the ‘supposed’ consensus that Lin Jian mentioned)
The Indian statement says, “Both SRs underlined the importance of maintaining peace and tranquillity in the border areas to promote overall development of the India-China bilateral relationship. They emphasised the need to ensure peaceful conditions on the ground so that issues on the border do not hold back the normal development of bilateral relations.
Here, the divergence is very clear. The Chinese statement, including by Lin Jian, uses the conjunctive ‘and’ (highlighted in red above) denoting simultaneous parallel tracks for ‘peace on the borders’ and ‘development of relations’. The Indian side is very clear that the ‘development of bilateral relations’ is predicated upon ‘peaceful conditions on the ground’. The Indian side took care to make these as two separate statements.
The above conclude Paragraph # 1 of the Chinese Statement.
“The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to continue seeking a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable package solution to the boundary issue in accordance with the political guidelines agreed upon by the Special Representatives of the two countries in resolving the boundary issue in 2005, and to take positive measures to promote this process”. - China
The above conclude Paragraph # 2 of the Chinese Statement
Lin Jian was even more explicit. He said, “Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to continuing to seek a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable package settlement to the boundary question in accordance with the political parameters and guiding principles agreed upon by the two countries’ special representatives in 2005, and to taking active measures to advance this process.”
(This is the fourth of the six points of the ‘supposed’ consensus that Lin Jian mentioned)“
The SRs reiterated the importance of maintaining a political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship while seeking a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable framework for settlement of the boundary question, and resolved to inject more vitality into this process.”
The Indian statement does not at all refer to any ‘package deal’. The Chinese side is very explicit. It has to be a ‘package solution’ agreed upon in c. 2005. This process has to be ‘promoted’ and only this would be promoted. So, what was the 2005 Package? The Chinese SR at that time was the experienced diplomat Dai Bingguo (In c. 2005, he was holding the same position as Wang Yi does today, Director of the Foreign Office). He later said, “If the Indian side takes care of China’s concerns in the eastern sector of their border, the Chinese side will respond accordingly and address India’s concerns elsewhere”. India can and will never agree to this.
“The two sides assessed the border situation and agreed to further refine the management and control rules in the border area, strengthen the buiding of confidence-building measures, and achieve sustainable peace and tranquility in the border” - China
The above conclude Paragraph # 3 of the Chinese Statement
Lin Jian made the same statement.
(This is the fifth of the six points of the ‘supposed’ consensus that Lin Jian mentioned)“Drawing on the learnings from the events of 2020, they discussed various measures to maintain peace and tranquillity on the border and advance effective border management. They decided to use, coordinate and guide the relevant diplomatic and military mechanisms towards this purpose.” - India
India’s position is clearer. It will offer refinements based on how the PLA behaved in spite of the various CBMs already in place and would therefore plug these holes. In all the commander-level talks in Ladakh after the April 2020 Chinese aggression, diplomats have also taken part in the discussions. The lessons drawn from 2020 must impose greater restrictions on movements of Chinese armed forces because they have an easier terrain unlike India.
“The two sides agreed to continue to strengthen cross-border exchange and cooperation, and promote the resumption of Indian pilgrims’ pilgrimage to Tibet, China, cross-border river cooperation and Nathula border trade.” - China
The above conclude Paragraph # 4 of the Chinese Statement
Lin Jian simply said, “Both sides agreed to continue enhancing cross-border communication and cooperation”
(This is the sixth of the six points of the ‘supposed’ consensus that Lin Jian mentioned).“
They provided positive directions for cross-border cooperation and exchanges including resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, data sharing on trans-border rivers and border trade.” - India
One point that we must note is that China never gives up any opportunity to reiterate its territorial claims. Similarly, it never gives up an opportunity to leave ambiguous the territorial claims of the other side.In the above, it said, “Tibet, China” and it omitted “Nathula, India”. The accession of Sikkim has never been explicitly accepted by China while India has unequivocally said that Tibet was part of China.
“The two sides agreed to further strengthen the construction of the Special Representatives meeting mechanism, enhance coordination and cooperation in diplomatic and military negotiations, and require the China-India Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on Border Affairs (WMCC) to carry follow-up implementation of the Special Representatives meeting”. - China
The above conclude Paragraph # 5 of the Chinese Statement
Lin Jian simply said, “further strengthen the Special Representatives meeting mechanism”
(This is part of the sixth of the six points of the ‘supposed’ consensus that Lin Jian mentioned).
India’s statement did not mention this point at all.
“The two sides agreed to hold a new round of the Special Representatives meetings in India next year, and the specific time will be determined through diplomatic channels”
Lin Jian made the same statement.
In addition, the two sides also had extensive and in-depth exchange of views on bilateral, international and regional issues of common concern, emphasizing the importance of a stable, predictable and good China-India relationship to international and regional peace and stability.
The above conclude Paragraph # 6 of the Chinese Statement
Lin Jian amplified this greatly, “At the meeting, Wang Yi also had in-depth and constructive discussion with Doval on China-India bilateral relations. Wang Yi said that as two major developing countries, representatives of emerging economies, and important members of the Global South, a healthy and stable China-India relationship is in the fundamental interest of the over 2.8 billion people of the two countries. This is also compatible with the trend of a rising Global South. The two sides need to have candid communication, enhance mutual trust, build consensus, and promote cooperation. It is important to channel the two countries’ respective valuable resources into development and revitalization, make sure that the boundary question is appropriately placed in bilateral relations, jointly maintain peace and tranquility in border areas, and strive to bring China-India relations back to a healthy and steady track at an early date.”
“The SRs exchanged views on bilateral, regional and global issues of mutual interest. They agreed on the salience of stable, predictable and amicable India-China relations for regional and global peace and prosperity.” - India
Clearly, the references to ‘Global South’ serve two of China’s four pressing purposes. Firstly, it wants to be the leader of the Global South. Specifically, it does not want India to wear that mantle, because it wants to push its agenda on the Global South and assume one more leadership position in the pursuit of its geostrategic goals. This is the ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’ moment for the Global South, and we know how such friendship ended up in the 1959-1962 period. Secondly, the Global South leadership role by China is to use it as a toolkit for opposition against the US, including attempts at de-dollarization. India can and should never be a party to this Chinese agenda of tianxia irrespective of India’s views on such issues.
Conclusion
There is only a tactical agreement on the ground situation in Ladakh regarding the status-quo ante and even this may have some ambiguity regarding some ground-level issues, including ‘buffer zones’ and others.
On the substantive issues, China continues to stick to its ‘package deal’ proposal which would be unacceptable to India in the form and content that China proposes.
China wants to convert this tactical deal into a ‘business as usual’ proposition without conceding anything on the strategic front. China may feel that time is still on its side and it does not need to engage India on the broader border settlement. China may argue, clever-by-half, that since there is a border agreement now, India must keep its promise of going back to ‘business as usual’.
First of all, any lingering issue on the border deal would naturally stall the ‘business as usual’ proposition. Secondly, if China shows no inclination of moving forward on the border resolution with a ‘give-and-take’ approach and continues with its obstructive approach, India too should calibrate its response accordingly.
Overall assessment is that this agreement is not anything to be pleased with knowing the nature of PRC and Indian border must continue to be guarded heavily. India also cannot dilute the strict rules it has put in place regarding trade and politics with PRC.
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