Image Courtesy: Reuterus
Article 04/2024
In the aftermath of the Taiwan elections, the world witnessed a series of responses to the same. Taiwan election results triggered responses from across the world, right from the US, Europe to countries from Asia, Africa, Caribbean and Oceania. The US showered its support to Taiwan’s new President while maintaining that it opposes Taiwan’s independence. Post the elections, some Pacific Island countries chose China over Taiwan by shifting their loyalties to China and severing their relations with Taiwan in the hope of acquiring developmental assistance from China. Countries from Latin America and the Caribbean mostly favoured Taiwan post elections while countries from South Asia, Southeast Asia & Africa have provided divergent responses in the wake of elections with Central Asia alone extending their absolute adherence towards one China principle. Some countries in Europe (geographically smaller in size) have stood resolute in expanding cooperation with Taiwan and have remained undeterred in the face of China.
In the light of the brief backgrounder, the paper intends to examine the endeavors of the US & the Pacific Island states in the aftermath of the 2024 Taiwan elections. The paper draws inferences on the US maneuvers in relation to Taiwan and throws light upon the existential crisis of the Pacific Island states that pushed them to choose between Taiwan and China.
The elections transformed the count of Taiwan’s allies at the world stage and has brought to limelight the grit of small powers in asserting their strategic independence in the face of major power competition and China’s wolf war diplomacy. Therefore, the author has predominantly focussed on analyzing the relations of small powers (states that are geographically smaller in size) with Taiwan post its elections.
US Manoeuvres Post Taiwan Elections
In the aftermath of the 2024 Taiwan elections, the major activities undertaken by the US in relation to Taiwan involves sending congratulatory messages to the Taiwan president elect, undertaking a congress delegation visit to Taiwan, the US exercising its freedom of navigation in Taiwan straits and wooing Pacific Island states to expand their cooperation with Taiwan. Apart from these, despite having active relations with Taiwan, the US would always make it clear that it does not support Taiwan independence. For instance, in the wake of Taiwan elections, President Biden reiterated that the US does not support Taiwan’s independence (Hindustan Times, 2024).
Recently, the US expressed its disappointment over Nauru terminating its relations with Taiwan (Ching, 2024). The US attempted to persuade Pacific island states to engage with Taiwan on the grounds that engaging with China would be disastrous as it would not fulfill its promises to the Pacific Island states.
On another note, it's pertinent to note that in matters concerning Taiwan, the US executive and legislative branches are unanimous in their decision to maintain relations with Taiwan. For instance, the US congress, (including members both from the Democratic and Republican party), expressed their wishes to the Taiwan President elect on his election victory and expressed their willingness to maintain relations with Taiwan (Office of the President, Republic Of China (Taiwan), 2024).
Apart from this, on January 25, 2024, about 7 US lawmakers (Lance Gooden, Tracey Mann, Michael Burgess, Randy Weber, Andy Biggs, Randy Feenstra, and Pete Sessions) sent a congratulatory letter to president-elect, Lai Ching-te (DeAeth, 2024). In addition, the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, a congressional member organization that aims at bettering the US-Taiwan relations met with Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing Wen on the 25th January, 2024 (refer fig, 0.1) (Congressman Brad Sherman, n.d.). In their meeting, the co-chairs of the Taiwan Caucus, Mario Diaz-Balart and Ami Bera reaffirmed the “strong ties” between the US & Taiwan (Chen, 2024). In the same meeting, Tsai Ing Wen claimed that Taiwan looks forward to the enactment of the US-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act into law to promote Taiwan-US economic exchange (Office of the President, Republic Of China (Taiwan), 2024). Previously, in 2019 the US-Taiwan caucus rallied for the signing of a bilateral trade agreement between the US and Taiwan and in 2022 the same group had petitioned for the inclusion of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. In this sense, the US lawmakers visit is not merely a symbolic act or a one time stint undertaken to anger China but is a manifestation of the US's way of maintaining its relations with Taiwan. The US prefers this approach to show the world (or China) that it upholds one China principle while continuing to discreetly engage with Taiwan by having concrete defense and economic exchanges.
(fig 0.2)
(fig 0.3)
Hudson institute, a think tank based in Washington sent its delegation to Taiwan (refer fig, 0.2). In addition to that, the US-Taiwan Business Council comprising representatives from diverse backgrounds including the “Defense, Energy, Medicine, Finance, and Technology sectors” had met with Taiwan President elect, Dr. Lai (refer fig, 0.3).
Apart from sending congratulatory messages and delegation visits to Taiwan, the US warship, USS John Finn (DDG-113) transited through a corridor in the Taiwan straits post the elections. The US 7th fleet justified the US warship transit by claiming that it was defending the “freedom of navigation for all nations” and added that no member of the international community can be threatened to compromise on their freedom and rights (Shelbourne, 2024).
This statement was released in the light of the US’s Taiwan straits transit in the aftermath of 2024 Taiwan elections. China perceives Taiwan straits as its internal territorial waters. By re-asserting the freedom of navigation for all nations principle, in the wake of the election victory of President Lai, US is connoting that Taiwan has emerged victorious in electing its leader by conducting its elections in a democratic manner devoid of any external interference (mainly China). The US’s transit post elections seem to convey that the conduct of political processes in Taiwan without China’s interference indicates that Taiwan has an existence independent of China and therefore the waters surrounding Taiwan cannot be China’s territorial waters. Although Taiwan has an independent existence from China, the US does not perceive Taiwan as an independent sovereign state as the US affirms the one China policy. Therefore, Taiwan straits in the eyes of the US is not Taiwan’s territorial waters as Taiwan as mentioned above is not perceived by the US as an independent state. Taiwan straits is neither China’s nor Taiwan’s territorial waters but international waters.
(Fig 0.4)
(Fig 0.5)
On 13th January, 2024, the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken sent across a congratulatory message to Lai Ching Te post his election victory (refer fig, 0.5) (US Department of State, 2024). He stated that “we look forward to working with Dr. Lai and Taiwan’s leaders of all parties to advance our shared interests and values, and to further our longstanding unofficial relationship, consistent with the U.S. one China policy as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances” (US Department of State, 2024). A US diplomat added that the US-Taiwan collaboration must "further the longstanding unofficial relationship” between US & Taiwan and be "consistent with the US One China policy" (Cursino & Bicker, 2024).
It becomes clear that the US intends to maintain ties with both China and Taiwan. The phrase “unofficial ties with Taiwan” is being used by the US to assuage China. Although it says that it seeks to maintain “unofficial ties” with Taiwan, by sending delegations (directly from the US legislature) to Taiwan and with the US representatives congratulating Taiwan’s president elect (refer fig, 0.4), the US is actually maintaining real, formal ties with Taiwan. Further from examining the interactions between the US & Taiwan counterparts, it shows that both parties are willing to expand their scope of relations in both defense and the economic sectors.
In this sense, the US policy of strategic ambiguity (of not fully fledged extending support to either of the two regions) helps the US in securing its trade, defense and strategic interests in the region. However, regardless of the extent to which the US attempts to sugarcoat its relations with Taiwan (by referring its relations with the island nation as unofficial), in the eyes of China, US holds active relations with Taiwan and China will continue to express its strong disapproval of any ties that foreign countries have with Taiwan as China deems Taiwan as an integral part of China.
Contextualising Taiwan’s relations with Pacific Island States in the aftermath of 2024 Taiwan Elections
In the aftermath of the Taiwan elections, some Pacific Island states resorted to shifting their loyalties towards China by ending their relations with Taiwan.
Tuvalu intends to review its diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the aftermath of their Jan 26, 2024 elections (Needham, 2024). Tuvalu wants more funds for managing climate change and for developmental purposes. Tuvalu’s support to China or Taiwan, Finance Minister Seve Paeniu (also a a former economic adviser to Nauru that recently severed its ties with Taiwan) says will be based on the ability of a “partner country to respond to and support achievement of Tuvalu's development priorities and aspirations” (Needham, 2024).
In another similar case, Nauru severed its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Nauru has decided to hold diplomatic relations with China at the ambassadorial level. In the joint communique on resumption of diplomatic relations, the government of the Republic of Nauru, stated that it will not have any “official relations or official exchanges” with Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2024). Taiwan expressed its condemnation of Nauru's decision by claiming that “the Nauru government, swayed by financial incentives, has succumbed to China's manipulation, disregarding the development assistance and friendship provided by Taiwan over the years” (Chen, 2024).
In yet another instance of show of support to China, Solomon Islands reiterated that Taiwan is a part of China. In his interview with the Tavuli News, Prime Minister of Solomon Islands Manasseh Sogavare attempted to justify the same by citing United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 that proposes that PRC is the “sole legitimate representative of China to the United Nations” (MOFA, Republic of China (Taiwan), 2024). This shows the extent to which some Pacific Island states would support China and the influence that the latter enjoys in the region.
(Fig 0.6)
Contrary to Nauru, Tuvalu and Solomon Islands, some pacific island states such as Marshall Islands (refer fig, 0.6) and Palau reaffirmed their relations with Taiwan post the elections. In a video conference with Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, the president of Marshall Islands, Hilda C. Heine pledged to maintain their relations with Taiwan and promote “security and resilience in the Indo-Pacific Region” (Chen, 2024).
On 17th January, 2024, in a phone call, Palau’s president, Surangel Whipps Jr. congratulated Lai by claiming that the elections indicate "the firm support of the people of Taiwan for freedom and democracy." He stated that the relations between the two regions have been “robust and are steadily growing.” Lai Ching-te claimed that the close relations between Taiwan and Palau exist due to both stakeholders’ adherence to democracy (Pei-ju, 2024).
Nauru’s decision came off as a surprise as the country’s leader had even congratulated Dr. Lai over his election victory (Davidson & Hawkins, 2024). Taiwan is said to be losing its allies in the Pacific Island states due to its decision to stop buying support from the international community via checkbook diplomacy like China does (Millar, 2024). This has made it convenient for China to buy those Pacific Island States’ that had previously nurtured diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
It is pertinent to take cognisance of the fact that Pacific Island states have no choice but to depend on financial incentives from developed or developing countries due to their economic and climate vulnerabilities. Therefore, they will automatically sway towards those countries whom they see as actors who would assist them in their development.
One major reason Pacific Island states are looking towards reestablishing diplomatic relations with China despite their strong sentiments towards democratic values and practices is the lack of concrete security and developmental assistance from democratic powers such as the US, Australia and the like. That’s the reason, Pacific Island states have inconsistent relations with China. For instance, Nauru had relations then broke relations with China and now it resumed its relations with China. After 22 years of having had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, it switched its loyalties to China. Likewise, in 2005 it again resumed its relations with Taiwan (Al Jazeera, 2024).
Pacific Island states don’t seem to be fully willing to engage with China as they have time and again expressed their apprehensions over China’s conduct. For instance, in 2021, 3 chinese vessels undertook surveying activities in the waters of Palau. Generally, in situations like these, Palau informs the US coast guard. However, due to geographical distance between the 2 nations, it becomes difficult for the US defense personnel from Guam to come to rescue (Yamaguchi, 2023). In this sense, apart from verbally wooing Pacific Island states to have relations with Taiwan, countries like the US must deliberate on ways to uphold the territorial security and also accelerate their developmental assistance to Pacific Island states so that they can continue to have real freedom to formulate their foreign policies towards aggressive actors like China.
Unfortunately, the US and other democratic countries encounter some issues in assisting the Pacific Island states. For instance, the US has been rolling out projects in the Pacific Island states. Currently, it is attempting to operationalise the intra-pacific cable project that would connect the Pacific Island states with the US and Australia. However, the obstacle in moving ahead with the project is the unfavourable digital ecosystems in some of the Pacific Island states. The US has expressed its willingness to invest in nodes of these countries only if they have their cables secured from end to end excluding "untrusted Chinese-built data centers or phone towers” (Needham, 2024).
Examining Global South-Taiwan Relations following 2024 Taiwan Elections
Significant inferences can be drawn from analyzing the statements released by the global south countries in the aftermath of the Taiwan elections.
South Asia, Central Asia, East Asia & Southeast Asia
In south Asia, the majority of actors reiterated their commitment to one China policy but the difference is rooted in the nature of statements released.
China’s all weather ally, Pakistan expressed its support to China in the wake of the 2024 Taiwan elections. Pakistan’s foreign ministry spokesperson stated that Pakistan upholds the one china policy and considers Taiwan to be an integral part of China (MOFA, Pakistan, 2024) (The Nation, 2024). Likewise, Bangladesh and Nepal also released a statement affirming its adherence to one China policy in the wake of the Taiwan election results (Hasib, 2024) (Business Standard, 2024).
In addition to upholding the one China policy, Maldives went a step ahead and expressed its support for the national reunification efforts of China (Mohamed, 2024) (Colombo Gazette, 2024). During Prime Minister Solih’s leadership, the country at one point deliberated in the parliament to appoint an ambassador to the Republic of China (Taiwan). With Prime minister Muizzu in power, a leader known for his pro-China policies, the recent response in the wake of Taiwan elections comes as little surprise. Sri Lanka also echoed similar sentiments as Maldives in the wake of Taiwan elections.
(fig, 0.7)
Maldives' statement, however, is more stronger than that of Sri Lanka in terms of its commitment to one China policy. As Mr. Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has commented (Kurlantzick, 2024), Maldives statement (refer fig, 0.7)
appears to be a statement issued by the foreign ministry of China.
The statements of Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh reflected a sense of symbolic support to China while statements released by the Maldives and Sri Lanka indicated a stronger and dedicated support to China’s concerns, denoting the extent of importance attached to China by these countries or the extent of influence that the latter has on these countries.
In addition to South Asia, Southeast Asia also witnessed varied reactions to the 2024 Taiwan elections. In Southeast Asia, except for Cambodia, all other states had extended their wishes to Taiwan’s president elect by maintaining their one China policy. The conveyance of the same by the Southeast Asian countries was unique to their respective relations with China.
Singapore congratulated Dr. Lai on his election victory and expressed its desire to continue developing friendly ties with Taiwan based on the state’s one China policy (MOFA, Singapore, 2024).
Like Singapore, the Philippines also extended its congratulations to Taiwan president’s election victory (Chang, 2024) (refer fig, 0.8). In the face of China's uproar, the Philippine President, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., justified his action by claiming that Taiwan hosts about 200,000 overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) and the gesture was a way of thanking Taiwan for the same (Al Jazeera, 2024).
Maintaining relations with Taiwan is of utmost necessity to the Philippines in comparison to other Southeast Asian states due to the significant proportion of Philippine diaspora in Taiwan and due to Manila being a neighbour to Taiwan. The Philippines president believes that the Philippines will be involved in the conflict between China and Taiwan simply because of its geographical proximity to Taiwan (Chen, 2023).
For other countries, maintaining relations with Taiwan becomes important to secure their economic interests. For instance, Vietnam released a statement claiming that while upholding the one China policy, it will continue to have non-governmental relations (and not state level relations) with Taiwan in areas including trade, investment, science and technology culture, education and so on (Hoang, 2024).
Similar to Vietnam, Indonesia also maintains trade ties with Taiwan and has also constituted a trade office in Taiwan. However, its statement (released in the wake of Taiwan elections) (Jakarta Globe, 2024) had no mention of the Indonesian desire in continuing economic relations with Taiwan while affirming the one China policy. This indicates that Indonesia does not seem to attach great significance to its trade relations with Taiwan as compared to Vietnam.
Only one southeast Asian country, Cambodia publicly took a strong stance in the favour of China, reflected in the statement the country released in the wake of the elections. Cambodia’s foreign ministry claimed that it will uphold “resolute adherence” to one China policy (Chheng, 2024).
Despite having trade relations with Taiwan, countries including Thailand, Laos, Malaysia, and Brunei refrained from commenting post the 2024 Taiwan elections (Ek, 2024). These countries might have preferred to shelve their relationship status (with Taiwan) to assuage China as economic partnership with China becomes more significant to uphold their national security.
Apart from South Asia and Southeast Asia, Central Asian states also asserted their views on the 2024 Taiwan elections. The growing influence of China in Central Asia becomes visible with the statements released by Central Asian countries on Taiwan elections. For instance, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry condemned the elections in Taiwan and opposed the interference in internal affairs of China (Azerbaijani Press Agency (APA), 2024). Uzbekistan affirmed its support to reunification of China and its commitment to one China policy (MOFA, PRC, 2024) (Gazeta.uz, 2024). Similarly, Tajikistan pledged to uphold one China policy and opposed external interference to China’s internal affairs (Sputnik India, 2024). Kazakhstan shared similar sentiments as other Central Asian countries (The Astana Times, 2024).
The Central Asian countries expressed their commitment to one China policy even during Nancy Pelosi’s visit (Tazhikenov, 2022). China is their top trade and investment partner, therefore they will continue to adhere to China’s security priorities. Moreover, they have nothing to lose if they fail to support Taiwan (in fact, on the contrary, they might end up angering China, their chief source of economic prosperity).
● Africa
(fig 0.9)
In the wake of the Taiwan election results, Somalian government issued a statement saying that it affirmed the one China policy and claimed that it construes Taiwan as an inalienable part of China (refer fig 0.9).
Eswatini is the only country in Africa to formally recognise the Republic of China (Chung, 2020). The country has sent its congratulatory message over Dr. Lai’s election victory. At present, Eswatini’s Foreign Minister, Pholile Shakantu is heading a delegation to Taiwan for a period of 5 days (from Jan. 31 to Feb. 4) (ref fig, 1.0) (Focus Taiwan, 2024). The kingdom of Eswatini attaches immense significance to its relations with Taiwan due to the latter’s significant role in promoting infrastructural development in Eswatini. Due to its relations with Taiwan, China banned sugar imports from Eswatini in 2020. However, Eswatini has claimed that it prioritizes “ideology over economic benefit” and is continuing to expand its relations with Taiwan (Nokukhanya Musi, 2023).
● Latin America & Caribbean
In the wake of the 2024 Taiwan elections, a sizable number of countries from this region have voiced their support for Taiwan.
(fig 1.3)
After congratulating Dr. Lai on his election victory, the government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines pledged to expand the existing bilateral relations with Taiwan (refer fig 1.3). Further, the presidents of St.Lucia and Belize have extended their wishes to Taiwan’s President elect, Dr. Lai and called for expanding the relations with Taiwan (refer fig 1.1 & 1.2).
In addition to that, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Carlos Ramiro Martínez had conveyed appreciation to Dr. Lai, Taiwan’s President elect (MOFA, Republic of China (Taiwan), 2024). In Taiwan’s delegation visit to Guatemala, the Guatemalan President, Arévalo pledged to maintain diplomatic ties between Taiwan and Guatemala (MOFA, ROC, Taiwan, 2024).
In a luncheon with Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaushieh Joseph Wu, Belizean Prime Minister John Briceño passed on a congratulatory letter to be forwarded to Taiwan’s President-elect Lai Ching-te over his election victory.
(fig, 1.4)
(fig, 1.5)
Paraguayan President Santiago Peña and Saint Kitts and Nevis Prime Minister Terrance Drew had congratulated Taiwan’s President elect. In addition to that, as shown in (fig 1.4 & 1.5), Paraguay and Saint Kitts and Nevis have been advocating the inclusion of Taiwan in world forums such as the World Health Forum.
There are some countries such as Antigua and Barbuda that have reaffirmed their one China policy in the wake of the Taiwan elections. Antigua and Barbuda’s Prime Minister Gaston Browne claimed that “Taiwan was, is, and will always be a province of China” (MOFA, ROC, Taiwan, 2024).
Although there seems to be a major support to Taiwan from this region, the situation might change with the change in the political leadership of the respective countries. The opposition parties of Paraguay have claimed to revisit its ties with Taiwan once they come to power, indicating that the country's support to Taiwan is not eternal.
2024 Taiwan Elections & Small Powers in Europe
Post the Taiwan elections, Czech President-elect Petr Pavel held a 15 minute telephonic conversation with Taiwan President, Tsai Ing Wen and emphasized on their “shared values of freedom, democracy and human rights” and also expressed his desire to meet the Taiwan President in future (Blanchard & Muller, 2023). In response to China’s condemnation over Pavel’s phone call, the Czech government asserted that the republic of Czech is a sovereign nation and it would decide with whom it should make phone calls with (Tian & Baptista, 2023).
The Czech republic decided to engage with Taiwan because of the republic’s tensions with China (Kalivoda, 2020) (Chaudhury, 2023). For instance, the country was disappointed with China over a lot of aspects, one being the lack of operationalisation of the Chinese investments. The 2023 security strategy of the country describes China as a systemic rival. Previously, in 2020, the Senate president and the mayor of Prague, Milos Vystrcil had led a 89 member delegation to Taiwan.
(fig, 1.6)
(fig, 1.7)
Apart from the Czech republic, Lithuania had expressed its support to Taiwan’s President elect, Dr. Lai. The head of the Lithuanian Parliamentary Group for Relations with Taiwan, Matas Maldeikis headed a 11 member cross-party delegation to Taiwan to meet with the Taiwan government officials to discuss areas of mutual cooperation (refer fig, 1.6) (Chen, 2024). In his meeting, Maldeikis praised Taiwan’s support for democracy (Office of the President Republic of China(Taiwan), 2024).
Observations & Analysis in the Context of China-Taiwan Tensions
The China-Taiwan scenario has brought to limelight the preponderance of brutal realpolitik (manifesting greatly in the Taiwan policies of Pacific Island states). Countries' decision to hold ties with Taiwan or China is based on their conviction on which country (Taiwan or China) can better suffice their security or economic needs.
Some states recognized the election victory of Taiwan. However, none of them released a statement saying they support Taiwan's independence. In this sense, their interaction with Taiwan is a means to deter China more than their proclivity in upholding democratic values. On the other hand it also indicates that they cannot openly call for Taiwan’s independence or in other words, afford crossing the red line with China as the latter is important to them in terms of promoting their respective states’ trade and economic growth. For others, their relations with Taiwan is a means of promoting their economic prosperity more than anything else.
Those states that showed complete opposition to Taiwan elections are those that prioritize their relations (majorly economic relations) with China (for instance, this scenario would suit countries like Cambodia, Maldives and Sri Lanka). It may also mean that since inception they have had no interaction with Taiwan and the latter is not significant in securing their national interests (countries from the Central Asian region may fall under this category).
Let alone foreign nations that refrain from supporting Taiwan's independence, even Taiwan calls for only the maintenance of the status quo. It's pertinent to note that status quo can be comprehended in different ways. It can be interpreted as independence— as maintaining the status quo means maintaining the present political or sovereign identity of Taiwan which is existing politically independent of China. Another interpretation to Taiwan’s call for status quo instead of declaring independence would be that Taiwan perceives itself as always having had independence. China (or any foreign nation) have never occupied or controlled any territory of Taiwan (Green, 2023). In this sense, Taiwan seeks to maintain its present status or remain independent like it has always been (or maintain status quo).
What is also clear is that Taiwan does not prefer to be desperate to expand its allies at the world stage. For instance, one means by which Taiwan maintains its relations with other countries is by extending developmental assistance but at the same time, Taiwan does not prefer buying its allies by adopting cheque book diplomacy. In another instance, when Nauru decided to sever its ties with Taiwan, the latter with immediate effect severed its relations with Nauru, in a move to uphold its national dignity (MOFA, ROC (Taiwan), 2024).
The 2024 Taiwan elections have brought to limelight the strength of small countries (small is being used to connote the geographical size of the country). Of all regions, countries from the Latin American and Caribbean region have been able to extend their full support to Taiwan without affirming the one China policy. Countries such as the Czech Republic, Eswatini and Lithuania have been able to strongly assert their policy towards Taiwan despite facing immense pressure from China. The world is absorbed with the US congress delegation visits to Taiwan and have failed to take note of the delegation visits undertaken by Lithuania and Eswatini to Taiwan post the 2024 elections.
Most importantly, the developments post the 2024 elections convey a pertinent message for Taiwan to secure its present self. Taiwan might have to keep asserting its sovereign rights by expanding cooperation with like minded states, calling out China’s aggressive behaviour and publicizing its cause at the global level to prevent the worsening of its existential crisis.
(Sruthi Sadhasivam is a Research Officer, Chennai Centre for China Studies (C3S). The views expressed does not reflect the views of C3S)
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